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Abstract: Confronted with a global pandemic, public healthcare systems are under pressure, making
access to healthcare services difficult for patients. This provides fertile ground for using illegal
practices such as informal payments to gain access. This paper aims to evaluate the use of informal
payments by patients during the COVID-19 pandemic and the institutions that affect the prevalence
of this practice. Various measurements of formal and informal institutions are here investigated,
namely the acceptability of corruption, the level of trust, transparency, and performance of the
healthcare system. To do so, a logistic regression of 10,859 interviews with patients conducted across
11 Central and Eastern Europe countries in October–December 2020 is employed. The finding is that
there are large disparities between countries in the prevalence of informal payments, and that the
practice is more likely to occur where there are poorer formal and informal institutions, namely higher
acceptability of corruption, lower trust in authorities, lower perceived transparency in handling
the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult access to, and poor quality of, healthcare services, and higher
mortality rates due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These findings suggest that policy measures for
tackling informal payments need to address the current state of the institutional environment.
Keywords: formal institutions; informal institutions; informal payments; public healthcare system;
trust; transparency; performance
1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic represents one of the most important and disruptive events
in the health sector for some decades. Due to its rapid spread throughout the world, there
has been a growing demand for access to health services. This has caused the growth in
some countries of informal payments to gain preferential access to health services [1]. These
informal payments are known by many different names including: ‘bribes/bribe payments’;
‘envelope payments’; ‘gratitude payments’; ‘informal payments’; ‘red packages/envelopes’;
‘under-the-table payments’, and ‘unofficial payments/fees’ [2]. In relation to the healthcare
sector, these informal payments represent an exchange, in cash or in kind, in which the
employees of the medical units and patients are involved, so that the latter benefit from
certain services, which otherwise should have been offered free of charge in the public
sector [3]. The requests for informal payments can be initiated by doctors, such as when
they consider that their salaries are low [4] or by patients who consider that they will
receive better care [5]. This is not some minor activity rarely occurring. In 2020 in the
European Union the highest rate of informal payments, used in the form of bribes, was
encountered in the medical sector (6% of all respondents) [6], with 22% of patients in
Romania making such payments and 19% in Bulgaria [6].
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Previous studies have analysed the socio-demographic characteristics of patients
making informal payments [7–12] and identified a wide array of factors that determine the
prevalence of informal payments in different institutional environments. These studies
cover both formal institutions (e.g., reduced monitoring of activities in the health sector [13];
lack of efficient management [13]; low level of legal penalties applied to people who have
an illegal behaviour [13]; state regulations, which lead to excessive bureaucracy [14]) and
informal institutions (e.g., personal factors, such as the desire to do something that is
against the law or the desire to get rid of a problem, patients’ perceptions, beliefs, attitude,
feelings and relationships) [14,15] or even the lack of alignment between the formal and
informal institutions [16]. However, no previous study has so far analysed the factors that
influence the prevalence of informal payments in healthcare during a major disruptive
event such as a global pandemic.
To fill this gap, the aim of this paper is to evaluate for the first time the drivers of
informal payments during the COVID-19 pandemic. To do this, an institutional theory
framework is used which investigates the role of formal and informal institutions (focusing
on three main issues: trust, transparency and performance) to better understand the deter-
minants of informal payments in the healthcare sector and evaluate the policy initiatives
required for reducing informal payments made by the users of public clinics or hospitals.
To evaluate the role of the institutional environment in the prevalence of informal
payments in healthcare, the next section briefly describe the previous literature on informal
payments made by patients for healthcare services and consequently, the hypotheses to be
tested. This is followed by an explanation of the materials and methods used for testing
these hypotheses. The third section then reports the results of both the descriptive statistics
and multivariate analysis. The final section discusses the findings and draws conclusions
of the implications of these findings.
1.1. Acceptability of Corruption
Starting with the role of informal institutions, previous studies show that informal
payments can be considered a means by which patients hope to receive better care [5]. At
the same time, some patients consider that they can benefit from care faster if they pay
an additional fee, in the form of an informal payment, while others believe that if they do
not make such a payment, they face the risk of not receiving the needed treatment [17].
Similarly, motivated by the low salaries received by the medical staff, patients can offer
these informal payments as recognition of the efforts they make, even in the form of a
gift [17]. But why should these additional non-taxable payments occur for a medical act
that is free in the public sector? One of the most important factors that influences people’s
behavior and, implicitly, the decisions they make, is their culture. It is represented by the
norms, values and beliefs that people have. This guides them to make certain choices in
life, about what is good or bad, and about what is acceptable and what is not [18]. As
such, corrupt practices and behavior are deemed acceptable in some societies but not in
others. Indeed, gifts or the usage of personal connections to get preferential access to public
resources are seen as ‘natural’ in some post-Soviet spaces [19,20]. Similarly, decisions
related to informal payments, can be made and deemed acceptable by some populations or
by some cultures. This is explained by the fact that social norms inform individuals about
the behavior of their peer citizens. Previous findings show that if an individual perceives
that others do not behave in a compliant manner, their acceptability of the respective
noncompliant behavior will be altered and the likelihood of engaging in similar behavior
will increase [21–23]. Indeed, a previous extensive literature review displays that features
such as patients’ perceptions, beliefs, attitude, feelings, willingness and relationships have
been found to be related to the prevalence of informal payments in healthcare [15]. As such
we propose to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to occur with higher
acceptability of corruption.
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1.2. Trust in Public Authorities
Another important driver of informal payments identified in previous studies is
represented by lost trust or a low level of trust in public authorities [15]. In general, it is
considered that there is an indirect link between trust and corruption [24]. Thus, if the
trust in the authorities is lower, the level of corruption in a country is higher. However,
other studies conclude that some issues, such as low trust, can be at the same time causes
as well as consequences of corruption [25]. As such, a low level of trust can lead to
corrupt behaviors but, at the same time, the perception of a high level of corruption further
deteriorates an individual’s trust, resulting in a vicious circle. Indeed, previous studies
show that the lack of trust in formal institutions alters individuals’ view on social norms
and thus, encourages dishonest behaviors. More than that, it has been found that social
trust is shaped over time by trust in formal institutions [26]. According to a report in
2020, the year the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, only 48% of EU citizens trusted their
national authorities [27]. Among the factors that could determine this level of confidence
are socio-demographic characteristics, such as age or level of education [28]. At the same
time, taking into account the pandemic context, trust in the authorities was influenced
by the following factors: ‘access to information’; ‘socio-economic resilience’; ‘pandemic
response measures and enforcement systems’; ‘governmental service provision’ [29]. Thus,
the political measures taken by governments regarding the COVID-19 pandemic [30,31],
and the attitude of those in citizens’ social networks are also correlated with the degree of
trust in public authorities [30]. As such, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to occur when patients
display low trust in authorities.
1.3. Perceived Transparency
As in the case of trust in the authorities, transparency and accountability are also
determinants of informal payments [15]. This type of payment is more common when
there is a lack of institutional transparency and accountability [27,32]. Therefore, we can
say that there is an inverse link between institutional transparency in a given state and
informal payments. Indeed, the risk of corruption is diminished if more information about
the decisions taken by public actors is visible and available to the general public [33]. In the
European Union, during the COVID-19 pandemic, only four out of ten people categorized
the activity of their national governments as transparent. The worst scores were recorded
in countries such as France, Poland or Spain [27]. However, even if transparency is
an indispensable factor in the medical system, it is sometimes not enough to diminish
corruption and create accountability among related people [34]. As such, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to occur when the
transparency of how the pandemic is handled is perceived as low by the patients.
1.4. Health System Performance
Turning to the role of formal institutions, another important determinant of informal
payments has been found to be the performance of the health system, including issues
such as quality and access to healthcare services, poor human resource management, lack
of medicine and other medical supplies, and an inefficient patient complaint process [15].
Informal payments can be considered as potentially triggered by these problems created
in the health system [5]. Usually, performance is characterized by the way in which
medical systems are governed [35]. When informal payments are used, the medical
system is considered to be degraded, requiring high costs [36]. One factor that could
improve the performance of the health system is transparency, the determinant previously
characterized [34]. Also, the performance of a health system can be directly correlated with
patient satisfaction [37]. When their satisfaction of the services they benefited from is high,
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the performance will be considered higher, and the probability of informal payments being
made by patients is lower. However, when resources are lacking, consumer satisfaction will
be limited, as the quality of services provided will be low in this case [38]. Thus, patients
will be determined to pay additional amounts to benefit from higher quality services [39].
Based on these finding we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to occur when the
health system performance is poor.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). Informal payments are more likely to occur when the access and quality of
public healthcare services are poorer.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Informal payments are more likely to occur when the pandemic mortality
rate is higher.
2. Materials and Methods
This paper uses the results of The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)—European
Union 2021, involving 40,663 respondents in 27 Member States of the European Union
(EU-27). Out of these, 25,744 respondents used the services of a public clinic or hospital
in the past 12 months before the survey took place. We confine the analysis here to the
respondents from Central and Eastern Europe (18,012 respondents out of which 10,859
were patients). The survey focused on corruption practices and was conducted during
the COVID-19 pandemic (from mid-October to December 2020) on behalf of Transparency
International. The sample includes respondents aged 18 years old or older and it is
representative at a regional level, including a minimum of 300 respondents at NUTS 1 level
(Eurostat’s Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics classification). This sampling
design ensured that the sample obtained mirrors the population parameters in relation to
age, gender, working status and educational level (for details, [40]).
A logistic regression analysis has been employed for analysing the link between
informal payments and the formal and informal institutions. The dependent variable is a
dichotomous variable displaying whether or not the respondent made informal payments
to get assistance or services needed from a public clinic or hospital in the past 12 months
prior to the survey. As such, considering that by mid-March 2020, Europe was at the centre
of the pandemic, classified as an international emergency by the World Health Organization
even from January 2020, it is reasonable to assume that most of the cases where public
clinics and hospitals were used in the past 12 months prior to survey by the respondents
fall under the COVID-19 pandemic period [41]. Moreover, the institution collecting the
data used in this paper acknowledges the fact that contact patterns with public healthcare
services are affected by the lockdown measures during the COVID-19 pandemic [27].
The main independent variables for testing the proposed hypotheses are:
Informal institutions
• Acceptability of Corruption Index—measures the acceptability of corrupt behaviour
and records the answers on how ‘acceptable is it for the government to engage in
corruption as long as it delivers good results’ (for testing Hypothesis 1) [6];
• Trust Index—a constructed index measuring the trust in public authorities based on
patients self-assessed trust level in the national and local government (for testing
Hypothesis 2) [6]; and
• Perceived Transparency Index—measures the perceived transparency by patients on
how the government handled the COVID-19 pandemic (for testing Hypothesis 3) [6].
Formal institutions
• Access and Quality Index—macro-level index constructed by two indicators: (a) access
or the extent to which medical services can be accessed by those who need them, and
(b) the quality in delivery healthcare services (for testing Hypothesis 4a) [42]; and
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• COVID-19 Mortality Index—macro-level index measuring the mortality rate due
COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants (for testing Hypothesis 4b) [43].
All indices were normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 means the highest positive
outcome (i.e., lowest acceptability of corruption, highest trust in public institutions, highest
perceived transparency on how the government handled the COVID-19 pandemic, easiest
access and high quality of public healthcare services, and lowest mortality rate due to
COVID-19) and 0 means the lowest negative outcome.
Based on previous literature on informal payments in the healthcare sector [44–48], the
other independent variables used as controls include: gender, age, education, employment
status, household income, and area of residence. Details about these variables are available
in Table A1.
The analysis involved an additive fashion approach for adding the socio-demographic
characteristics of the respondents and the indices measuring the formal and informal
institutions for assessing their effect on the prevalence of the informal payments. In
addition, to better display the relationship between the prevalence of informal payments
made for services of a public clinic or hospital and the formal and informal institutions,
predicted probabilities of making informal payments in accordance with the institutional
setting were graphically displayed. Below, we report the results of the analysis.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 provides an overview of the informal payments made by the users of public
clinics or hospitals in the EU member states. Out of 40,663 respondents participating in
the survey, 25,744 accessed the services of a public clinic or hospital in the past 12 months
prior to the survey. The practice is found to be more prevalent in East-Central Europe
(12% of those accessing the services of a public clinic or hospital made informal payments)
and less prevalent in Nordic nations (1%). These results are not surprising in the light of
previous findings that reveal the prevalence of this practice is higher in East European
countries and in post-communist societies [19,49,50]. However, these results should be
treated as lower bound estimates considering that the investigated issue is illegal and some
of the respondents might be reluctant in openly admitting their involvement in such a
practice [51]. Interesting, however, is that when looking to how often this practice was
employed by those declaring making informal payments, in Nordic nations the patients
making informal payments employ this behavior on a more regular basis (20% of those
declaring making such payments) compared with other EU 226 regions (18% in Southern
Europe, 15% in East-Central Europe and 11% in Western Europe). Nevertheless, this
needs to be cautiously interpreted considering the low prevalence of the practice in the
Nordic nations.





Once or Twice A Few Times Often
Central and
Eastern Europe
12 56 29 15
Nordic Nations 1 57 23 20
Southern Europe 4 55 27 18
Western Europe 3 66 23 11
EU-27 6 57 28 15
Source: author’s calculations using data from [6].
Turning to the cross-country variation, Table 2 reveals high differences, from 2%
making informal payments of those who accessed the services of a public clinic or hospital
in Estonia to 19% in Bulgaria, Hungary and Lithuania and 22% in Romania. Variations
also exist in terms of how often these informal payments are made for services of a public
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clinic or hospital services. This practice proves to be rather an exception, being made only
once or twice in Slovenia (84% of those making informal payments). Meanwhile, informal
payments represent rather a norm being made a few times or even often by those declaring
making such informal payments for a public clinic or hospital among patients in Romania
(63%), Latvia (52%), Bulgaria (48%) and Croatia (44%).
Table 2. Public clinic or hospital users making informal payments, by Central and Eastern European





Once or Twice A Few Times Often
Romania 22 37 37 26
Bulgaria 19 52 34 14
Hungary 19 58 19 23
Lithuania 19 57 37 6
Croatia 15 56 20 24
Czechia 10 69 26 5
Latvia 10 48 33 19
Poland 10 59 34 7
Slovakia 10 66 28 6
Slovenia 5 84 12 4
Estonia 2 65 24 11
Central and Eastern Europe 12 56 29 15
Source: author’s calculations using data from [6].
Table 3 starts to investigate the link between the prevalence of the informal payments
for the services of a public clinic or hospital and the formal and informal institutions.
Starting with the informal institutions, the finding is that those not making informal
payments have a higher Acceptability of Corruption Index (i.e., a lower acceptability of
corrupt behaviour). Those not making informal payments have a higher Trust Index (0.47)
compared with those making informal payments (0.38). Also, those not making informal
payments perceived a higher transparency on how the government handled the COVID-19
pandemic compared with those making such informal payments (Transparency Index of
0.50 compared with 0.37). This is similarly the case when moving to the assessment of the
healthcare system performance and starting to analyse formal institutions. The informal
payments are less prevalent in those healthcare systems with easy access and high quality
of healthcare services as well as a lower mortality rate caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
As such, the tentative finding is that formal and informal institutions are directly linked to
the propensity of making informal payments for services of a public clinic or hospital.




Acceptability of Corruption Index 0.67 0.72
Trust Index (Trust in public authorities) 0.38 0.47




Access and Quality Index (For public healthcare
services)
0.52 0.54
COVID-19 Mortality Index (COVID-19
deaths/100,000 inhabitants)
0.42 0.48
Notes: normalized indexes 0 to 1, where 1 = highest positive outcome. Source: author’s calculations using data
from [6,42,43].
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3.2. Multivariate Analysis
In order to investigate whether the tentative descriptive results hold when other
variables are taken into account and kept constant, Table 4 provides the results of a logistic
regression analysis. For testing the reliability of the results, the analysis follows an additive
fashion by gradually adding the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and
the informal institutions, followed by adding in turn the formal institutions. Starting with
the influence of the socio-demographic characteristics and informal institutions, Model 1
shows that older age groups are less likely to make informal payments. Meanwhile, those
facing financial difficulties, those with a higher education and those living in a small or
middle-sized town are more likely to make such payments. No significant differences were
identified in relation to gender and employment status. Turning to the institutions, and
starting with the informal institutions, the finding is that those having a higher Accept-
ability of Corruption Index (i.e., a low acceptability of corrupt behaviour) are less likely to
make informal payments for services of a public clinic or hospital, validating Hypothesis
1. Models 2 to 5 add, in turn, the other indicators measuring the informal institutions as
well as measuring the formal institutions alongside the socio-demographic characteristics
and the Acceptability of Corruption Index. The results for the socio-demographic char-
acteristics remain broadly the same and the Acceptability of Corruption Index remains
unchanged, showing the robustness of the findings. Starting with Model 2, Hypothesis 2 is
validated. Those with higher trust in public authorities are less likely to make informal
payments for services of a public clinic or hospital. Similarly, as Model 3 displays, those
who perceived a higher transparency on how the government handled the COVID-19
pandemic are less likely to make informal payments for services of a public clinic or hos-
pital (validating Hypothesis 3). Moving to the country-level indicators measuring the
health system performance (i.e., formal institutions), as Model 4 and Model 5 display, the
results are in the same direction as the descriptive analysis indicated. The individuals are
less likely to make informal payments for the services of a public clinic or hospital with
healthcare systems which provide easy access and high quality of healthcare services (vali-
dating Hypothesis 4a) as well as lower mortality rate caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
(validating Hypothesis 4b).
In order to further demonstrate the validity and the robustness of the findings, Table 5
provides the results of various alternative regression methods. The first column (the logistic
regression applied on weighted data) represents the approach employed in this paper and is
detailed in Table 4. However, if an alternative method is applied, such as using the logistic
regression without weighting the data (with or without clustering the data by country)
or using it with imputed data where missing, similar results are obtained. Similarly, if
employing a probit regression (with or without weighting scheme) taking into account the
issue of a potential sample selection (i.e., the fact that only the subsample of individuals
who used the services of a public clinic or hospital has been analysed), the results on the
significance and the direction of the influence of formal and informal institutions on the
prevalence of informal payments made by patients remain unchanged. The results of
testing the proposed hypotheses are summarised in Table 6.
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Table 4. Logistic regression of the probability to make informal payments for public healthcare services in Central and Eastern Europe.
Model 1 Model 2
Fixed Part Coef. SE OR (OR, 95% CI) Coef. SE OR (OR, 95% CI)
Socio-demographic control variables
Gender (R: Male)
Female 0.022 0.082 1.022 (0.870–1.200) 0.034 0.083 1.035 (0.880–1.217)
Age −0.011 *** 0.004 0.989 (0.982–0.996) −0.009 ** 0.004 0.991 (0.984–0.998)
Education (R: Primary, Secondary)
Tertiary 0.207 ** 0.087 1.230 (1.037–1.458) 0.251 *** 0.088 1.285 (1.082–1.527)
Employments status (R: Working full-time)
Working part-time 0.129 0.188 1.138 (0.787–1.647) 0.170 0.189 1.185 (0.819–1.716)
Not working (seeking) −0.181 0.212 0.835 (0.551–1.264) −0.179 0.211 0.836 (0.553–1.265)
Retired −0.011 0.137 0.989 (0.756–1.294) −0.023 0.138 0.978 (0.746–1.281)
Not working (not seeking) −0.210 0.317 0.811 (0.436–1.508) −0.270 0.327 0.764 (0.402–1.449)
Student −0.125 0.232 0.883 (0.561–1.390) −0.037 0.232 0.964 (0.611–1.520)
Homemaker −0.094 0.201 0.910 (0.614–1.349) −0.060 0.202 0.942 (0.633–1.400)
Household income (R: Enough to buy what
wanted)
Enough to buy what needed 0.021 0.106 1.021 (0.830–1.257) −0.034 0.106 0.967 (0.785–1.190)
Facing difficulties 0.420 *** 0.113 1.521 (1.218–1.900) 0.256 ** 0.116 1.291 (1.029–1.621)
Area (R: Rural area or village)
Small, middle-sized town 0.268 ** 0.105 1.307 (1.064–1.606) 0.237 ** 0.106 1.267 (1.030–1.560)
Large town 0.186 * 0.103 1.205 (0.985–1.474) 0.165 0.104 1.179 (0.962–1.445)
Tested Hypotheses
Acceptability Index 1 −0.270 *** 0.090 0.764 (0.641–0.910) −0.247 *** 0.091 0.782 (0.654–0.934)
Trust Index 2 −1.492 *** 0.174 0.225 (0.160–0.316)
Constant −1.605 *** 0.201 −1.010 *** 0.210
Observations 10,109 10,070
F 4.86 9.39
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
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Table 4. Cont.
Model 3 Model 4
Fixed Part Coef. SE OR (OR, 95% CI) Coef. SE OR (OR, 95% CI)
Socio-demographic control variables
Gender (R: Male)
Female 0.019 0.083 1.019 (0.865–1.200) 0.008 0.084 1.009 (0.856–1.190)
Age −0.008 ** 0.004 0.992 (0.985–0.999) −0.007 ** 0.004 0.993 (0.986–1.000)
Education (R: Primary, Secondary)
Tertiary 0.237 *** 0.089 1.267 (1.064–1.509) 0.276 *** 0.090 1.318 (1.105–1.571)
Employments status (R: Working full-time)
Working part-time 0.136 0.191 1.146 (0.788–1.666) 0.183 0.194 1.201 (0.820–1.758)
Not working (seeking) −0.116 0.211 0.890 (0.589–1.346) −0.133 0.212 0.876 (0.577–1.328)
Retired −0.022 0.140 0.978 (0.744–1.287) −0.060 0.140 0.941 (0.715–1.239)
Not working (not seeking) −0.352 0.340 0.704 (0.362–1.369) −0.315 0.339 0.729 (0.375–1.419)
Student −0.041 0.231 0.960 (0.611–1.508) 0.018 0.228 1.018 (0.651–1.593)
Homemaker −0.124 0.211 0.883 (0.584–1.336) −0.138 0.209 0.871 (0.579–1.312)
Household income (R: Enough to buy what
wanted)
Enough to buy what needed −0.047 0.107 0.954 (0.773–1.177) −0.034 0.108 0.966 (0.782–1.193)
Facing difficulties 0.267 ** 0.117 1.306 (1.039–1.641) 0.209 * 0.118 1.233 (0.979–1.553)
Area (R: Rural area or village)
Small, middle-sized town 0.204 * 0.107 1.226 (0.994–1.513) 0.121 0.110 1.129 (0.910–1.401)
Large town 0.138 0.105 1.148 (0.934–1.410) 0.066 0.107 1.068 (0.866–1.317)
Tested Hypotheses
Acceptability Index 1 −0.284 *** 0.093 0.752 (0.628–0.902) −0.323 *** 0.093 0.724 (0.603–0.869)
Trust Index 2 −1.235 *** 0.195 0.291 (0.198–0.426) −1.027 *** 0.196 0.358 (0.244–0.526)
Transparency Index 3 −0.403 *** 0.104 0.668 (0.545–0.819) −0.419 *** 0.106 0.657 (0.534–0.809)
Health system Performance
Access and Quality Index 4 −1.437 *** 0.195 0.238 (0.162–0.349)
COVID-19 Mortality Index 5 −1.823 *** 0.211 0.161 (0.107–0.244)
Constant −0.923 *** 0.213 0.637 ** 0.279
Observations 9794 9794
F 9.34 14.66
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000
Notes: Significant at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Coefficients compared to the reference category (R) shown in brackets; 1 Acceptability of Corruption Index; 2 Trust in public authorities—Trust Index; 3
Transparency in handling COVID-19 pandemic—Transparency Index; 4 Health system performance: Access and Quality; 5 COVID-19 deaths/100,000 inhabitants—Mortality Index. Source: author’s calculations
using data from [6,42,43].
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 10914 10 of 17
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis.
Logistic Regression
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Prob. > F/chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Significant at ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Coefficients compared to the reference category (R) in brackets; Standard errors displayed in
parentheses; 1 Acceptability of Corruption Index; 2 Trust in authorities—Trust Index; 3 Transparency in handling COVID-19 pandemic—
Transparency Index; 4 Health system performance: access and quality; 5 Health system performance: COVID-19 deaths/100,000 inhabitants—
Mortality Index; 6 Socio-demographic variables included in the selection equation: age, education. Source: author’s calculations using data
from [6,42,43].
To further display the influence of the formal and informal institutions on the preva-
lence of informal payments made by patients, Figure 1 displays the predicted probability
to make informal payments by a ‘representative’ patient in Central and Eastern Europe by
informal institutions and formal institutions (trust in authorities; transparency in handling
the COVID-19 pandemic; health system performance: access and quality and COVID-19
deaths/100,000 inhabitants). The results show that the probability of a patient making
informal payments decreases with better informal institutions (i.e., less acceptability of
corrupted behaviour) and better formal institutions (i.e., higher trust in authorities, higher
perceived transparency in handling the COVID-19 pandemic, easier access and higher
quality of healthcare services and lower mortality rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
Table 6. Summary of the results.
Hypothesis Result
H1: During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to
occur with higher acceptability of corruption.
Confirmed
H2: During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to
occur when patients display low trust in authorities.
Confirmed
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Table 6. Cont.
Hypothesis Result
H3: During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to
occur when the transparency of how the pandemic is handled is
perceived as low by the patients
Confirmed
H4: During a pandemic, informal payments are more likely to
occur when the health system performance is poor.
H4a: Informal payments are more likely to occur when the access
and quality of public healthcare services are poorer.
Confirmed
H4b: Informal payments are more likely to occur when the






Figure 1. Predicted probability to make informal payments by a ‘representative’ patient in Central and Eastern Europe,
by Acceptability of Corruption Index and: (a) Trust Index (trust in authorities); (b) Transparency Index (transparency in
handling COVID-19 pandemic); (c) Access and Quality Index (health system performance: access and quality); (d) COVID-19
Mortality Index (health system performance: COVID-19 deaths/100,000 inhabitants). Notes: After logistic regression. The
‘representative’ patient in Central and Eastern Europe was obtained by taking the mean and mode of the socio-demographic
characteristics as displayed in Table A1, namely: female, 49 years old, primary or secondary educated, working full
time, having enough money to buy what is needed and living in a large town. Source: author’s calculations using data
from [6,42,43].
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4. Discussion
This paper has highlighted the prevalence of informal payments during the COVID-19
pandemic. Due to the specificity of the period, committing acts of corruption can be an
opportunity for those who are accustomed to this practice [52]. Indeed, the finding of
this paper is that 12% of the patients in Central and Eastern Europe made at least one
informal payment during the analysed period. As the authorities’ efforts are more focused
on taking measures to prevent new coronavirus infections, acts of corruption such as
informal payments can be considered an ignored pandemic [53,54]. This emphasizes the
need to apply measures to discourage the use of informal payments. To achieve the goal of
reducing the use of informal payments, these measures should be tailored by the type of
determinants that generate their occurrence.
Firstly, the way in which informal payments are perceived by citizens should be
changed, especially among those with financial difficulties or better education. Older
people will have to be excluded from this category, as they are less likely to make such
payments. In general, patients are tempted to follow the provisions of unwritten rules,
being supported by the institutional asymmetry of the country in which they live [55,56]. In
this regard, various steps can be taken to change the behavioural intentions of consumers
and reduce institutional asymmetry, thus improving personal norms, such as: information
campaigns for vulnerable people about the costs and adverse events that may occur when
informal payments are used, or by making normative appeals to the parties involved to
diminish their intentions to use such practices [56].
Secondly, building trust in public authorities is needed. This needs a major effort by
the authorities considering that, during this period, the degree of trust in the authorities is
directly proportional to the way in which citizens perceive the management of the COVID-
19 pandemic [57]. Furthermore, people who are not in good health are reluctant to trust
the government [28]. Given that the main threat of the COVID-19 pandemic is to endanger
human health, the authorities’ effort will be twofold. Thus, if the authorities will be able
to manage the pandemic issue in an efficient manner, the risk of infection will be lower,
and consequently, the trust of the citizens will be higher. As documented by previous
studies, some measures that could foster trust include accurate monitoring of the delivery
process, enforcing precise control mechanisms and promoting accountability in the health
system [15].
Also, another measure to reduce the spread of informal payments is to increase
transparency. During the pandemic, this was a delicate subject. The most important
doubts were those related to the distribution of the vaccine and those related to the
development of vaccination campaigns, which could have given rise to certain risks of
corruption [58]. Through an increase in transparency in the health sector, patients will be
able to make a comparison between providers in the market, to make the most appropriate
and effective choices [59]. However, there may be some limitations. Transparency is based
on public reporting by the authorities, and to be effective, it should play the following
roles: providing information that can be easily understood; published data should be
clearly targeted to those who need them, not to the whole mass of patients; the existence of
financial interventions by political decision-makers [60]. Civil society organisations can
take a direct role in improving trust in the way that authorities manage the COVID-19
pandemic and increasing transparency through acting as ‘watch-dogs’ by monitoring the
public procurement contracts as well as the supply chain of the medicines and supplies
needed [61].
Finally, the improvement of the performance in the health system must be considered
if informal payments in healthcare are to be tackled. Often, this is translated into the quality
of the services provided by doctors. One solution could be to collect formal fees from
patients, and to reinvest these funds to improve medical facilities [39]. In this way, the
prevalence of informal payments would be reduced, and patients would have the chance
to benefit from better services. Additional funding may also come from the authorities
themselves. They could support health systems by providing financial incentives or even
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by adopting initiatives, which can take different forms: ‘regulation and self-regulation’;
‘guidelines’; ‘performance targets’ [62]. At the same time, taking into account another
factor mentioned above, improving the performance of the health system can also lead to a
strengthening of trust in the authorities. These things can happen through more in-depth
knowledge of the experiences, needs and aspirations that citizens have [63].
The analysis in this paper, however, has been unable to explore the cultural issues
that affect the decision of making informal payments for the services of a public clinic or
hospital. Future qualitative research (using for example, ethnography) is necessary for
complementing these quantitative findings by exploring in depth the cultural issues and
social norms that influence the decision to make informal payments for healthcare services.
5. Conclusions
As a result of its characteristics, the COVID-19 pandemic has proven to be a productive
period for committing acts of corruption, especially in the use of informal payments. This
paper has advanced the understanding of informal payments by employing the institutional
theoretical framework in a particular period, when the global healthcare systems have
been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings show that the high acceptability
of corruption, lower trust in authorities, lower perceived transparency in handling the
COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., informal institutions), as well as difficult access and poor quality
of healthcare services, and higher mortality rate due to the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e.,
formal institutions) are directly linked to a higher prevalence of informal payments in
healthcare. However, a potent future research avenue is represented by an analysis of the
interdependences between the various determinants of the informal payments identified
in this paper.
Whether the results of this paper are valid when evaluating other regions beyond
Central and Eastern Europe needs to be evaluated. If this paper encourages scholars to
employ the institutional theory framework in other geographical areas, then one of the
intentions of this paper has been achieved. If the paper also encourages the policy makers
to tailor their policy measures for tackling the informal payments in accordance with the
current state of the institutional environment they operate in, then the paper will have
fulfilled its wider intention.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.V.H. and C.C.W.; methodology, A.V.H. and C.C.W.;
software, A.V.H., C.C.W. and C.I.; validation, A.V.H., C.C.W., R.I.D. and C.I.; data curation, A.V.H.,
C.C.W., R.I.D. and C.I.; writing—original draft preparation, A.V.H., C.C.W., R.I.D. and C.I.; writing—
review and editing, A.V.H., C.C.W., R.I.D. and C.I.; visualization, A.V.H., C.C.W., R.I.D. and C.I.;
supervision, A.V.H. and C.C.W.; project administration, A.V.H.; funding acquisition, A.V.H. All
authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was supported by a grant of the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digiti-
zation, CNCS/CCCDI—UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2019-0163, within PNCDI III.
The APC was funded by the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, CNCS/CCCDI—
UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-TE-2019-0163, within PNCDI III.
Institutional Review Board Statement: The study was conducted according to the guidelines of the
Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics Committee of “Grigore T. Popa” University of
Medicine and Pharmacy (no. 62/24.03.2021).
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Publicly available datasets were analysed in this study. This data can
be found here: https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/eu/european-union-2021/press-and-downl
oads, accessed on 1 August 2021.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design
of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript, or
in the decision to publish the results.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2021, 18, 10914 14 of 17
Appendix A
Table A1. Analysed variables (n = 10,859).
Variable Variable Type Mode or Mean Min, Max
Socio-demographic control variables
Gender Dummy Female (56%) 0, 1





Employment status Categorical Working full-time (52%) 1, 7
Household income Categorical
Having enough to buy
what needed (45%)
1, 3
Area Categorical Large town (36%) 1, 3
Index
Asymmetry Index
Normalized Index 0 to 1 (0 = high
asymmetry level—formal-informal




Normalized Index 0 to 1 (0 = low level of
trust in public authorities (local and national
government); 1 = high level of trust in public
authorities (local and national government)).
0.46 0, 1
Transparency Index
Normalized Index 0 to 1 (0 = low level of
transparency in handling COVID-19
pandemic; 1 = high level of transparency in
handling COVID-19 pandemic).
0.49 0, 1
Access and Quality Index
Normalized Index 0 to 1 (0 = low health
system performance in terms of access to and
quality of public healthcare services; 1 = high
health system performance in terms of access
to and quality of public healthcare services).
Access = extent to which medical services can
be accessed by those who need them. Quality
= quality in delivery healthcare services.
0.54 0, 1
COVID-19 Mortality Index
Normalized Index 0 to 1 (0 = high COVID-19
mortality rate (COVID-19 deaths/100,000
inhabitants); 1 = low COVID-19 mortality
rate (COVID-19 deaths/100,000 inhabitants).
0.48 0, 1
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